California (like many states) passed its own variant of Jessica’s Law which prohibited convicted sex offenders from living close to parks, schools, and other places which people believe children are likely to congregate. California granted an exception to the law to people who already lived near such places, but any subsequent arrest for any offense required the offender to move. J.S. was convicted of sexually assaulting a fifteen year when he was sixteen. For years J.S. continued to live with his mother. Then he received a ticket for driving the wrong way down a street, which was technically a misdemeanor under California law. This required him to move from the home he was living in for years. Jessica’s law is being challenged on constitutional grounds. Some former supporters of the law have changed their position because the law has made sex offenders homeless, more transient, and therefore potentially more dangerous. Earlier this year, California's Sex Offender Management Board, which includes many law enforcement officials, urged changes in Jessica's Law and found that the residency restrictions were counterproductive, particularly because of a surge in offenders declaring themselves transients, making it even harder to track their whereabouts To read the Silicon Valley (formerly San Jose) Mercury News story on this case, click here. To read the Contra Costa Times summary of the case, click here.

Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”) requires an individual “who is convicted of a listed offense after October 1, 1995, to register as a sex offender.” MCL 28.723(1)(a). The definition of “listed offense” in MCL 28.722(e) includes a catchall provision, MCL 28.722(e)(xi), which states that “[a]ny other violation of a law of this state or a local ordinance of a municipality that by its nature constitutes a sexual offense against an individual who is less than 18 years of age,” constitutes a listed
offense.

Last week, in People v Atlhoff, the Michigan Court of Appeals had the opportunity to clarify what the registration obligations were under this provision. Mr. Althoff had been convicted of downloading child pornography from the internet. The question was whether this act constituted a “sexual offense against an individual who is less than 18 years of age” under the Act.

Previously, in People v Meyers, 250 Mich App 637, 649 NW2d 123 (2002), the Court stated that in catch-all cases, a Court was required to look at the specific facts of a given case to determine whether the Defendant’s conduct fell within the catch-all. In December of 2006, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded Althoff to the Court of Appeals as on leave granted. In its remand order, the Michigan Supreme Court stated in dicta that the language in Meyers was dicta. People v Althoff, 477 Mich 961 (2006). In People v Golba, the Court of Appeals stated that this language was holding. In Altholff, the Court of Appeals found that Golba was wrongly decided because it ignored the remand order in Althoff. In other words, the Court of Appeals created a “wrongly decided” exception to Michigan’s “first out rule.” Because the prior panel failed to detect or credit a suggestion that Meyers was dicta, the decision was invalid. Even though Michigan’s court rules require to follow a post-1990 published Court of Appeals decision, Atlhoff chose not to. In the process, the Court has inadvertently created an exception which will swallow the rule. The authors of this decision will regret their words.

According to the Tennessean, Tennessee and Kansas have created sex offender style registries for persons convicted of possessing methamphetamine. When will the craziness stop? There is no showing that these registries stop recidivism and there is strong evidence of exactly the opposite -- they directly impede a person’s ability to resume a normal life.