ELIMINATE MANDATORY DRUG
SENTENCES, ALLOW PAROLE
Senate Bill 280 with House committee
amendments
Sponsor: Sen. William Van Regenmorter
Senate Bill 281 with House committee
amendments
Sponsor: Sen. Mike Rogers
First Analysis (12-4-97)
Senate Committee: Judiciary
House Committee: Judiciary
THE APPARENT PROBLEM:
Ever since the 1978 recodification of the Public Health
Code, which incorporated mandatory minimum
sentences for certain narcotics and cocaine offenses
enacted earlier that year in other legislation (see
BACKGROUND INFORMATION), there have been
those who have questioned the need for, and efficacy of,
such an approach to illegal drugs. In particular, the
provision requiring nonparolable life imprisonment for
having, making, delivering, or having with the intent to
deliver, any mixture containing cocaine or narcotics
such as heroin that weighs 650 grams (23 ounces or
about 1.4 pounds) or more -- known as the "650-lifer
law" -- has been criticized as "draconian." As originally
enacted, mandatory minimums were not included for
violations involving mixtures containing narcotics or
cocaine of less than 50 grams. Reportedly, New York
officials, Detroit police, and the federal Drug
Enforcement Administration all urged that quantity
levels remain high and that no minimum terms be
imposed on the lowest level dealers in order to avoid
filling up the courts and prisons. However, the 1987-88
legislative crime package did add mandatory minimum
terms (which reportedly some law enforcement officials
had wanted all along), only to see the earlier prediction
come true: courts were inundated with cases involving
low level drug dealers and state prisons were filled with
people convicted of drug offenses at the lowest end.
After more than a decade of a prison boom, however,
and a growing reluctance of taxpayers to pay for ever
greater numbers of prisons that seem to be filled as soon
as they are built, many state policy makers have begun
to reconsider the desirability of mandatory minimum
sentencing for nonviolent offenders. Since many
convicted drug offenders are nonviolent but expensive
to keep incarcerated, decades-old arguments against
mandatory minimum drug sentencing are
beginning to appear more compelling to many former
proponents of such an approach. Legislation has been
proposed that reflects this change in perception.
THE CONTENT OF THE BILLS:
Senate Bill 280. Currently, the Public Health Code
(MCL 333.7401 and 333.7403) makes it a felony
punishable by mandatory imprisonment for life without
parole, to possess (but see BACKGROUND
INFORMATION, below), manufacture, create, deliver,
or possess with intent to manufacture, create or deliver
a "mixture" of a schedule 1 or 2 narcotic drug (which
includes opium and its derivatives, including heroin) or
cocaine (a schedule 2 drug). (Public Act 249 of 1996
allows one exception to this mandatory life provision:
juvenile violators who are tried as adults, either in
circuit or probate court, may be punished by
imprisonment for at least 25 years instead of mandatory
life imprisonment.) The penalties for lesser amounts are
as follows:
** 225 to 650 grams, imprisonment for not less than 20
years but not more than 30 years;
** 50 to 225 grams, imprisonment for not less than 10
years but not more than 20 years;
** manufacture, creation, delivery, or possession with
intent to do so of less than 50 grams, imprisonment for
not less than one year but not more than 20 years, a
possible fine of up to $25,000, or probation for life;
** possession only of 25 to 50 grams, imprisonment for
not less than one year but not more than four years, a
possible fine up to $25,000 or probation for life; ** possession only of less than 25 grams, imprisonment
for up to four years and/or a fine up to $25,000.
The health code further requires terms of imprisonment
imposed under the above provisions be imposed to run
consecutively with any term of imprisonment imposed
for committing another felony. People subject to
mandatory terms of imprisonment under the code are
not eligible for probation, suspension of their sentences,
or parole during that mandatory term (except where the
code allows probation for life), nor are they eligible for
a reduction in that mandatory term by disciplinary
credits or any other kind of sentence credit reduction.
Finally, the health code allows courts to depart from
minimum terms of imprisonment for drug offenses if the
court finds (on the record) that there are "substantial and
compelling" reasons to do so. Public Act 249 of 1996
also allows courts to depart from minimum terms in the
case of juvenile violators who are tried as adults, either
in circuit or probate court, if the juvenile has not
previously been convicted of a felony or an assaultive
crime, including another felony or assaultive crime
arising from the drug transaction.
The bill would remove all of the current minimum terms
of imprisonment for offenses involving schedule 1 or 2
narcotics or cocaine mixtures (as well as the court
"departure" language), while keeping the current
maximum sentence terms and fines. The bill also would
return possession of less than 50 grams of such mixtures
to the single penalty of imprisonment for not more than
four years and/or a fine up to $25,000. Finally, the bill
would remove the current consecutive sentencing
requirements in the code.
Senate Bill 281. Currently, under the corrections code
(Public Act 232 of 1953), all offenders sentenced to life
imprisonment are eligible for parole after serving 15
years of the sentence with two exceptions: prisoners
sentenced to life imprisonment for first degree murder
and those sentenced for life or for a minimum term of
imprisonment for a major drug offense. The bill would
amend the act (MCL 791.234 and 791.236) in the
following ways:
Parole eligibility. The bill would make major drug
offenders eligible for parole, once they'd served 15
years of their sentences (though they would still also be
subject to the "truth-in-sentencing" requirements,
namely, if their crime was not subject to "truth-in-sentencing" they would have to have served the
minimum time imposed by the court minus "good time"
or disciplinary credits, or, if their crime was subject to
"truth-in-sentencing," they would have to have served
the minimum term imposed by the court plus
disciplinary time). The bill also would require the parole
board to consider the following factors
when determining whether or not to release a "drug
lifer" on parole:
** whether the prisoner's drug crime was part of a
continuing series of drug crimes involving the
possession, manufacture, creation, or delivery (or intent
to do so) of schedule 1 or 2 narcotics or cocaine
mixtures;
**whether the prisoner had committed the drug crime in
concert with five or more other individuals; and
** whether the prisoner was "a principal administrator,
organizer, or leader" of an entity that he or she knew
(or had reason to know) committed or was organized to
commit ("in whole or in part") violations of sections
7401 (manufacture, creation, delivery, or possession
with intent to do so of schedule 1 or 2 narcotics or
cocaine) or 7403 (possession of these drugs) and that
individual's crime was committed to further the interests
of that entity.
Parole revocation. The bill would require the revocation
of the parole of prisoners convicted of violating or
conspiring to violate the health code's top two delivery
or possession categories (over 225 grams) if the parolee
subsequently committed a violent felony or committed
a four-year violation of the health code's controlled
substances article (Article 7).
The bill also would require that the parole orders of
major drug offenders released on parole contain a notice
of the above conditions under which the parole would be
revoked.
Random drug testing. The bill would require the random
drug testing of all parolees (not just those convicted for
drug offenses) and would require the department to
provide adequate drug testing materials to parole agents
for such random drug tests.
Tie-bar. The bills are tie-barred to each other and to a
bill that has not yet been introduced that reportedly
would amend the Code of Criminal Procedure to
conform with the bills' proposed changes.
HOUSE COMMITTEE ACTION:
The House Judiciary Committee amended Senate Bill
280 to remove all of the Public Health Code's current
mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for drug
offenders, eliminate the code's current mandatory
consecutive sentencing for drug offenses, delete the
bill's "drug lifer" parole eligibility provisions, and
(since there would no longer be mandatory minimum
terms) delete the current provision in the code regarding
court departures from the minimum mandatory terms of
imprisonment for drug offenders (including the recently enacted separate
option of a 25 year maximum sentence for waived
juveniles).
The House Judiciary Committee also amended Senate
Bill 281 to limit offenses that are not parolable to first
degree murder (and to give "650" drug offenders
eligibility for parole after serving 15 calendar years of
their sentences, as is now the case for other life
offenses), require the parole board to consider certain
factors (intended to distinguish drug "kingpins" from
"mules") in determining whether a current "650-lifer"
could be released on parole, and require that drug
offenders' parole be revoked if they later either
committed a violent felony or committed a 4-year
violation of the controlled substances article of the
health code. In addition, the House Judiciary Committee
deleted language in the bill that would have required (a)
that paroled drug "lifers" be placed on parole and under
supervision for life, (b) nonparolable life imprisonment
for any paroled drug offender who committed any
subsequent felony or drug violation, and (c) "broad-band" drug testing of parolees. The House committee
kept language requiring random drug testing of parolees
and notification to paroled drug offenders of the
conditions under which their parole would be revoked
under the bill's provisions (i.e. if they committed a
violent felony or a 4-year violation of the code's
controlled substances article).
The House committee kept the tie-bar between the two
bills, broke the tie-bar to Senate Bills 278 and 279 (that
would break the statutory tie-bar between "truth-in-sentencing" legislation -- and sentencing guidelines --
and extend "truth-in-sentencing" to all felonies), and
added a tie-bar to a bill (request number 05053'97) that
reportedly will amend the Code of Criminal Procedure
to conform with the other two bills' proposed changes.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION:
The "650-drug lifer" law. Public Act 147 of 1978
amended the Controlled Substance Act (Public Act 196)
of 1971 to change the penalties for the illegal
possession, sale, or delivery of any mixture containing
Schedule 1 or 2 narcotic drugs (opium and its
derivatives, including heroin) or cocaine. Before Public
Act 147, the manufacture or delivery of schedule 1 or 2
narcotic drugs was punishable by imprisonment for up
to 20 years and/or a fine up to $25,000, at the court's
discretion, while the manufacture or delivery of cocaine
was punishable by imprisonment for up to seven years
and/or a $5,000 fine. Possession of a Schedule 1 or 2
narcotic drug was punishable by imprisonment for up to
four years and/or a $2,000 fine, while possession of
cocaine was punishable by imprisonment for up to two
years and/or a $2,000 fine. Public Act 147 was to have
taken effect on September 1, 1978, and would have made several
changes in the penalty structure for the manufacture,
delivery, or possession of schedule 1 or 2 narcotic drugs
or cocaine (a schedule 2 drug): Cocaine would no longer
carry lesser penalties than those for schedule 1 or 2
drugs, the severity of the penalties would be graduated
and based on specified amounts of mixtures containing
these drugs, and, finally, imprisonment for amounts
weighing 50 grams (1 3/4 ounces) or more would carry
mandatory minimum sentences without the possibility of
parole or probation. More specifically, the penalties for
the illegal manufacture, delivery, or possession of a
mixture of a schedule 1 or 2 narcotic or cocaine would
be as follows: (1) Mandatory life imprisonment without
parole or probation for mixtures weighing 650 grams or
more (the so-called "650 drug lifer" law); (2) mandatory
10 to 30 years imprisonment without parole or probation
for mixtures weighing 225 to 649.99 grams (8 to 23
ounces); and (3) either mandatory 10 to 20 years
imprisonment or probation for life for mixtures
weighing from 50 to 224.99 grams (1 3/4 to 8 ounces).
Second or subsequent convictions would carry a
mandatory life imprisonment penalty.
Penalties for violations involving mixtures weighing less
than 50 grams remained differentiated between those
involving illegal possession (imprisonment for up to four
years and/or a fine up to $2,000) and those involving
illegal manufacture or delivery (imprisonment for up to
20 years and/or a $25,000 fine, at the court's
discretion), and were not changed by Public Act 147.
Public Act 147 was to have taken effect September 1,
1978. However, the Controlled Substances Act -- and
with it, the pending drug penalty changes -- was almost
immediately repealed and instead incorporated into the
1978 recodification of the Public Health Code, Public
Act 368 of 1978, which took effect (except as otherwise
provided by specific provisions of the code) on
September 30, 1978.
The 1987-88 legislative "crime package" included two
laws that established one-year minimum terms for drug
offenses involving even small amounts of narcotics or
cocaine. Public Act 275 of 1987 revised the penalty
provisions for the manufacture or delivery of cocaine or
narcotics, while Public Act 47 of 1988 did the same for
possession offenses.
Court challenges. The "650-drug lifer law" has
withstood challenges before both the U.S. and the state
supreme courts, though the state supreme court did
strike down the part of the law requiring mandatory life
imprisonment for "simple" possession.
In 1990, the United State Supreme Court ruled [in
Harmelin v Michigan, 111 S Ct 2680 (1991), Justice
White dissenting] that Michigan's "650-drug lifer" law
did not violate the "cruel and unusual" provisions of the
Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. However,
in June 1991 (in the consolidated cases of People v
Hassan, Docket No. 89661, and People v Bullock,
Docket No. 89662), the state supreme court (on a 4-3
decision) struck down mandatory life imprisonment for
conviction for simple possession as unconstitutional, on
the grounds that it violated Michigan's constitutional
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. While
the state attorney general and the Department of
Corrections almost immediately argued that the ruling
did not apply to convictions for delivery, the Michigan
Court of Appeals (in People v Fluker) struck down
mandatory life imprisonment for delivery of mixtures of
650 grams or more as unconstitutional on the same
grounds as the earlier decision on possession. However,
in April 1993, the state supreme court overturned the
appeals court rulings, thereby reinstating mandatory life
imprisonment for delivery of 650 or more grams of a
mixture containing heroin or cocaine.
"Drug lifers." According to the Department of
Corrections, as of September 23, 1997, of the 240
prisoners who have ever been sentenced to life terms for
drug law offenses, 210 currently are serving sentences,
though five of these are no longer serving on the
original offense (one had the sentence reversed by the
court and was resentenced to life, while the other four
had their convictions discharged or reversed by the
court and were resentenced to minimums in the range of
6-20 years, with 30-year maximums). Of the 205
remaining prisoners serving active sentences, 196 are
male and 9 are female; 85 are white, 97 are black, 13
are Mexican, and 10 are "other." In terms of the
counties involved, Oakland (with 67), Wayne (with 63),
and Macomb (with 22) have the highest numbers. Kent
(with 9) and Saginaw (with 8) have the next highest
numbers, while Kalamazoo County has 4, and Clinton,
Eaton, Genesee, and Washtenaw Counties each has 3.
Calhoun County has 2, while Berrien, Ingham, Ionia,
Livingston, Monroe, and Van Buren Counties each have
1. With regard to the "650-drug lifer" law, 167 lifers
are serving for delivery or manufacture, while 38 are
serving for possession. Finally, 173 prisoners have no
prior prison record, while 32 do.
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS:
According to the House Fiscal Agency, the bills could
result in savings of an indeterminate amount for the
Department of Corrections (DOC). To the extent that
the bills led to reductions in the amount of prison time
served by certain drug offenders, they would reduce the
costs of incarceration, which average about $15,000 to
$20,000 per prisoner annually for relatively low-security
placement.
Sentencing patterns and plea-based convictions suggest
that the current presumptive minimum framework has
had a complex effect on the criminal justice system. For
example, in 1996 only about 45 percent of the sentences
for the lowest delivery offense (which involves less than
50 grams) were to prison, and, when sentenced to
prison, DOC data show that these prisoners receive a
minimum term of around two years (which is double the
statutory minimum) and that almost 90 percent of the
current prisoner/parolee convictions for this offense
were plea-based. Conversely, about two-thirds of those
sentenced to prison for delivery offenses involving 50 to
649 grams received sentences substantially shorter than
the statutory minimum, and similar patterns hold for the
possession offenses, with a longer actual sentence
served for the lowest offense (an average of 1.6 years
instead of the statutory minimum of one year) and
sentence averages well under the statutory minimums
for the higher offenses. As a result, it is not possible to
predict and quantify the likely effect of proposals to
eliminate the statutory minimum sentences for these
drug offenses.
Other provisions in the bills could result in cost savings
to the state through reducing state costs of incarceration.
Consecutive sentencing, which carries the potential to
greatly increase sentence length for some offenders,
would be eliminated; to the extent that this resulted in
sentences being served concurrently rather than
consecutively, state costs for incarceration would be
reduced. In addition, by making currently-incarcerated
prisoners eligible for parole (or eligible for parole
sooner), the bills also could reduce state incarceration
costs, as could making various drug offenders eligible
for disciplinary credits. (12-3-97)
ARGUMENTS:
For:
It is long past time to do away with Michigan's
draconian drug sentencing laws, which have been a
costly social experiment; there is no good research data
to support claims that these laws have been an effective
way of reducing drug use and drug crime. In fact,
without even considering the issue of justice (where
mandatory minimum drug sentences are seen as just
punishment for heinous offenders), the cost-effectiveness of such laws has been questioned by recent
studies, such as the RAND's 1997 Drug Policy
Research Center report on "Mandatory Minimum Drug
Sentences: Throwing Away the Key or the Taxpayers'
Money." The RAND report argues that mandatory
minimum drug sentencing laws are wasteful of
taxpayers dollars in the sense that conventional law
enforcement and treatment are more cost-effective ways of controlling drug use and drug-related crime, with a principal reason for these findings
being the high cost of incarceration.
In fact, many of the arguments that were offered two
decades ago against the mandatory minimum sentencing
approach currently in the Public Health Code have been
borne out. This approach purportedly was introduced
with the intent of providing a deterrent to illicit traffic of
opiate narcotics and cocaine in Michigan by catching so-called drug "kingpins" and thereby, presumably,
reducing both the number of drug dealers and drugs on
"the street." Yet opponents of this approach argued that
the draconian nature of the proposed "solution" to the
problem of illicit narcotics and cocaine could have
unintended effects, including overloading the courts and
prisons with low-level drug dealers ("couriers" and
"mules," many of whom themselves are addicted and
involved in the drug trade as a means of supporting their
addiction) and a reluctance of juries to convict because
of the severity of the sentences. In addition, critics of
mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses raised
questions about the desirablilty of shifting sentencing
power from judges to prosecutors, about the lack of
evidence that this approach is an effective deterrent to
crime, and about the desirability of concentrating on a
punitive rather than rehabilitative approach to criminal
justice.
The House Legislative Analysis Section arguments
against the legislation that implemented the mandatory
minimum sentencing approach to narcotics and cocaine
remain startlingly current. The 1978 analysis pointed
out, for example, that "Instead of ensuring that the
state's major drug dealers spend substantial periods of
time in jail, the bill could backfire. Convictions on drug
charges could become more difficult to obtain, because
juries might be more apt to acquit in reaction to the
severe penalties. In addition, it has been suggested that
one possible negative consequence of the bill would be
that major drug dealers who are the intended target of
the legislation might use addicts to transport large
quantities of drugs rather than take the risk of facing
long mandatory prison sentences themselves. If this
happened, the drug traffic would continue and only
addicts, who already are victims' of the drug scene,
would be faced with long prison sentences." Moreover,
"Severe, mandatory prison sentences are a simplistic
approach to the complex problem of illicit drug activity.
There is no real evidence that they will serve as a
deterrent to crime. A deterrent effect could be
reasonably hoped for only if the state could ensure
certainty of apprehension as well as certainty of
punishment. Given the size of the state's addict
population and the potential for profit, new dealers
would quickly take the places of those sentenced to
mandatory jail terms. Meanwhile, the problems which
provoke and foster drug addiction remain unaddressed.
In fact, many critics of the strict law enforcement
approach to drugs believe that it is not only a futile
method, but one that ultimately worsens the problem.
When one major heroin channel is broken and the
supply decreases, the price of heroin increases
proportionately, and profitability soars. This can create
a type of crime inflation,' since the price of heroin
appears to have a direct effect on street crime." The
1978 analysis also argued that "Mandatory minimum
sentences undermine the modern concept of criminal
justice, which endeavors to treat individual defendants
separately, fairly, and with due process of law. The bill
stresses punishment and thwarts rehabilitation. If
prisons are to be correctional' instead of punitive,
prisoners must have incentives to participate in prison
rehabilitation programs. By requiring a fixed prison
term, with no possibility of parole, the bill destroys
much of that incentive. Further, the bill could impose an
intolerable burden on the state's courts and penal
institutions, because criminal defendants faced with
severe mandatory sentences would insist upon jury
trials, and long prison terms with no possibility of
parole would quickly overload the already overcrowded
prisons." Finally, the analysis argued that "The power
to sentence should belong to judges; the bill would, in
effect, shift that power from judges to prosecutors.
Sentencing judges must have unrestricted power to
choose an appropriate sentence according to the
condition of the defendant, the record of prior criminal
activity, and the requirement of public protection.
Discretion in sentencing is particularly important on
drug offenses, because so many violators are victims of
their own addiction and poverty."
After two decades, the mandatory minimum sentencing
law reportedly has caught mostly low-level couriers
(often, addicts and first-time offenders who engage in
this activity to support their drug "habit") and, at the
most, some mid-level drug dealers, when it has worked
at all. And sometimes it has resulted in blatant
miscarriages of justice, as in cases involving a large
element of entrapment of addicted users who otherwise
never would have become involved in dealing relatively
large amounts of drugs. Moreover, the punishment
simply does not fit the crime in many cases, and in fact
is disproportionately harsh when compared to sentences
for more violent crimes, where the criminal is eligible
for parole. Only first-degree murder carries with it the
same penalty as the "650-drug lifer" law, while other
violent crimes -- such as rape, second-degree murder,
and armed robbery -- carry much lesser sentences,
including the possibility of parole. Surely these violent
crimes should be punishable by sentences more severe
than those currently meted out for dealing drugs.
Despite claims that the law was and is an indispensable
and effective anti-drug weapon, the law never did
achieve its purported goal of ridding the streets of drug
pushers
and serving as a deterrent to drug trafficking, as even its
original sponsor and many influential former supporters
now admit. In fact, many influential voices in law
enforcement -- including the Macomb County prosecutor
himself, once a strong proponent of the law -- now
advocate giving judges, not prosecutors or parole
boards, primary authority over sentencing (along with,
perhaps, enforcing truth-in-sentencing policies that
would guarantee that minimum sentences would not be
reduced by "good time" credits or other means). It also
can be argued that the draconian nature of the
punishment has served as a positive disincentive for
convicting people under this law, and for bargaining
down offenses, so that the whole purported point of the
law is blunted if not rendered moot.
Finally, despite a huge prison expansion program over
the past decade, prisons still are overcrowded.
Mandatory life sentences for certain drug convictions --
as well as other mandatory, if lesser, sentences for
drug-related crimes -- threatens the state's limited prison
capacity and already overburdened taxpayers. The
policy not only doesn't make sense financially, it also
can result in the early release -- due to lack of space --
of such violent offenders as rapists and armed robbers,
who probably pose a greater danger to more of the
state's citizens than those involved in illegal drugs.
After over a decade of building and filling prisons,
many taxpayers are questioning the desirability of
having so much of the state's budget tied up in prisons
when other socially desirable needs, such as public and
mental health and education, should receive funding
being eaten up by the growth in the prison system.
Against:
Proponents of the law continue to argue that it was
designed as, and has been successful as, a deterrent to
drug trafficking. Some even say that it is law
enforcement's most valuable tool in the war against
drugs. As for the argument that there is a lack of
"proportion" between sentencing for violent crimes such
as rape, second-degree murder, and armed robbery --
none of which carry nonparolable life sentences -- and
the nonparolable life sentences for trafficking in large
amounts of drugs, proponents of the law point out that
just because a drug dealer may not be engaged in any
immediate, visible violence in the drug transaction,
selling drugs is, in fact, as bad as premeditated murder.
In fact, it is argued that severe sentences are justified
for drug trafficking because the crime is, in fact, as
deadly as premeditated murder. Trafficking in large
amounts of drugs is more deadly than first-degree
murder, in many cases, because unlike premeditated
murder, which often involves only a single victim, 650
grams or more of heroin or cocaine affects -- if not
destroys -- the lives of hundreds of people who come
into contact with it. And drug trafficking damages society as a whole, including
many of its children who live in poverty and perhaps
come to see it as a way of getting the things they'll
never have even if they got and held down regular jobs.
Moreover, if people believe that there is an improper
discrepancy between sentences for obviously violent
crimes such as rape, second-degree murder, and armed
robbery and sentences for drug trafficking, then perhaps
the sentences for these violent crimes should be
increased rather than decreasing the sentences for drug
trafficking.
Response:
As the author of the RAND report mentioned above
points out, the question of what are appropriate drug
offender sentences can be approached from either a
"moral" view (where, for example, mandatory minimum
drug sentences are seen as just punishment for heinous
offenders) or from the perspective of what is most
effective for achieving the goals of reducing drug use
and drug-related crime. And while there are honest
disagreements about which moral perspective is correct,
it seems clear from recent research that the current
approach to controlling or reducing drug use and drug-related crime is not as effective as other -- if less
punitive -- approaches, including conventional law
enforcement (including expanding budgets for arresting,
prosecuting, and incarcerating drug dealers with shorter
sentences) and rehabilitative approaches that emphasize
treatment rather than extended incarceration. The author
of the RAND report, interestingly, also points out a
difference in the perspectives of those advocating these
different approaches. He says, "treatment is like an
investment; you pay now but derive benefits in future
years. Conventional enforcement is like paying as you
go. Extending sentences is like buying something with
a credit card; you get the benefits now, but the bill
comes due in the future. Hence, long sentences should
be most appealing to people with very short time
horizons."
It also should be pointed out that the current penalty
provisions in the law apply to "mixtures" of schedule 1
or 2 narcotics, cocaine (a schedule 2 drug) or
marijuana; all other penalty provisions apply to the
drugs in a presumably pure form. What this means is
that while 650 grams -- 23 ounces or about 1.4 pounds
-- sounds like a lot when talking about, say, heroin or
cocaine, in fact, the penalties apply to the weights of
"mixtures." So someone can be convicted of trafficking
in a "mixture" of cocaine or heroin that weighs about
1.4 pounds and be sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole, but the actual amount of the pure drug
itself may well be much less, even as little as one
percent of the total weight. Someone who is convicted
of having or selling much smaller quantities of these
drugs, conversely, may well be sentenced to a much
shorter sentence. So the incentive in the current law
actually is to deal in purer -- and far more
deadly, at least until "cut" or diluted for the street -- but
smaller amounts of these drugs.
Finally, with regard to the detrimental effect that the
example of "easy" drug money can have on the values
of children living in poverty, it could equally be argued
that it is the poverty, and not the trafficking in drugs
itself, that constitutes the real problem and one which is
much more difficult to face.
POSITIONS:
Representatives from the following groups submitted
testimony in support of the bills as amended by the
House Judiciary Committee (12-2-97):
The Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan
Attorneys Against Excessive Mandatory Minimums
Michigan Appellate Assigned Counsel
The Oakland County Bar
Michigan Families Against Mandatory Minimums
The Michigan Catholic Conference
The Michigan Conference of the National
Organization for Women
The Detroit Branch of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People
Analyst: S. Ekstrom
ūThis analysis was prepared by nonpartisan House staff for use by House members in
their deliberations, and does not constitute an official statement of legislative intent.